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**THE FUTURE OF THE  
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

By

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# **THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

“You can do a lot with diplomacy, but with diplomacy backed up by force you can get a lot more done.”<sup>1</sup>

## **1      Introduction**

European heads of state and government took a crucial step toward the development of a new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the European Union’s (EU’s) Helsinki summit in December 1999.<sup>2</sup> They created the ESDP to allow the European Union to play a more comprehensive role in civilian and military international crisis management backed by credible military power. Today, the ESDP is considered a key element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar of the European Union.

This paper analyzes how the ESDP will develop. It describes briefly the evolution of the ESDP and analyzes the relations between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).<sup>3</sup> In addition, it describes the perspective of the United States (U.S.) on European Security and Defence. The paper concludes that the ESDP will be effective if certain actions are taken.<sup>4</sup>

## **2      The Evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy and the NATO-EU Relationship**

During the Cold War, Europe’s security was mainly a NATO responsibility. By the 1980s, the Western European Union (WEU) undoubtedly constituted a roundtable for discussing European security issues: “From the mid-1980s, when the European political class began to think seriously about enhanced coordination of EC/EU security policy, the

solution to the conundrum seemed to be best sought via the *Western European Union*... It was the only dedicated *European* security and defence institution common to most EC/EU member states.<sup>5</sup> However, for the 1980s and most of the 1990s, an autonomous EU role in the field of security and defence—outside NATO—was virtually unimaginable.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global security environment changed. After the official disbandment of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991, NATO was still in charge of European defence, and eleven of twelve EU member states were Alliance members.<sup>6</sup> The new security environment in Europe and the dissatisfaction with U.S. policy generated the desire to change the organizational structure in which the European states worked together.<sup>7</sup>

In the 1990s, some EU member states—like the United Kingdom—wanted to build a European pillar inside NATO and protect the dominance of the Alliance. Other EU member states—like France and Germany—wanted to focus on strengthening the already existing WEU. “... Countries, such as the United Kingdom, who were in favour of the Alliance’s primacy, while acknowledging the need for greater coordination of foreign policy, were opposed to any transfer of competence in security matters to the Union... France, reasserting its desire to strengthen its relationship with Germany, had suggested raising its military collaboration with its eastern neighbour to a European level.”<sup>8</sup>

NATO began adapting to the new security environment very quickly. The Alliance shifted its strategy from flexible response and forward defence towards a new strategic concept. In November 1991, NATO members decided in Rome that “... they would actively seek cooperation and dialogue among all European states...,” and that “... the European members of NATO would assume greater responsibility for their own security.”<sup>9</sup>

With the Treaty on European Union—signed on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht—the signatories also agreed on the development of a CFSP within the EU.<sup>10</sup> “The common

foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.”<sup>11</sup>

In addition, the European heads of state and government called for the implementation of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).<sup>12</sup> Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty incorporated an indirect request to the WEU to execute decisions and actions of the European Union which had defence implications. Additionally, the Treaty on European Union included an indirect request to NATO to support possible EU military missions. “The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance....”<sup>13</sup>

In June 1992, at a meeting on the Petersberg, near Bonn, the 10 WEU ministers declared their readiness to make available military forces for crisis management or conflict prevention operations under the authority of the WEU.<sup>14</sup> The WEU member states defined three categories of possible missions, subsequently known as the Petersberg Tasks, which they viewed as appropriate for a collective European capability—“... humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking....”<sup>15</sup>

After the Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht, NATO took action to integrate ESDI into the Alliance. NATO member states made collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance available to EU-led military missions, and initiated the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). “The [original] intent of the CJTF initiative was to provide flexible command arrangements within which allied forces could be organized on a task-specific basis to take on a wide variety of missions beyond the borders of alliance countries.”<sup>16</sup> Additionally, the CJTF provided deployable headquarters that could be

employed by WEU-led operations. Thereby, the CJTF supported building ESDI within NATO. With these actions, the Alliance reaffirmed support for building ESDI inside NATO to rebalance tasks and responsibilities between Europe and the United States.

At the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 3 June 1996 in Berlin, it was officially agreed that the ESDI would be carried out by the WEU but structured within NATO. “The... objective is the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance... This identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.”<sup>17</sup> In addition, there was agreement that NATO would remain the fundamental medium for security consultations, and there would be “... full transparency between NATO and the WEU in crisis management....”<sup>18</sup> With these agreements, ESDI became a “separable but not separate” part of NATO.<sup>19</sup>

At the Anglo-French summit at Saint Malo, on 3-4 December 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac shifted the focus of common defence and security from the WEU to the European Union. Both agreed that “... the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises... Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union....”<sup>20</sup> The British Prime Minister and the French President declared that the European Union should have the capacity to respond to international crises when NATO doesn’t want to get involved. “In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures... taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU.”<sup>21</sup>

At the fiftieth anniversary Washington NATO summit in April 1999, the European Union gained recognition as a serious partner on defence issues. The Alliance decided that ESDI would be built within NATO and supported with the so-called “Berlin-Plus” arrangements.<sup>22</sup> These new arrangements “... assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations...,” and “... the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations.”<sup>23</sup> It was agreed that the European Union itself would carry out crisis management missions using NATO capabilities and assets as foreseen at the 1996 ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin. In addition, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson argued that the EU initiative “... would maintain the ‘indivisibility’ of the transatlantic link, would ‘improve’ European capabilities, and would be ‘inclusive of all the allies’.”<sup>24</sup>

However, the Kosovo air war in 1999 made absolutely clear to the European leaders that Europe was far from being in a position to move towards collective security autonomy. The Europeans were still not able to back up their diplomatic and economic instruments of power with strong military means. This war revealed NATO’s internal capabilities gap and “... made it clear that the United States had better resources for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; more accurate precision-guided munitions [PGMs]; as well as superior air and sealift resources, logistics, and communications.”<sup>25</sup> Additionally, most EU member states—predominantly France and the United Kingdom—were also extremely concerned about the very complex EU/WEU and NATO decision making processes.<sup>26</sup>

At the EU’s summit in Cologne, on 3-4 June 1999, in the immediate aftermath of Kosovo, the European Council decided to shift the WEU assets to the EU and give the EU the resources and capabilities needed for the implementation of a European Security and Defence Policy.<sup>27</sup> The EU member states appointed Javier Solana as the High Representative for the

CFSP to help advance the ESDP.<sup>28</sup> Additionally, the EU governments called for improvement of the EU's capabilities in the fields of command and control, strategic airlift, and intelligence.

The initial resolution of the European Union and NATO working relationship was challenging. The first issue was to make NATO assets and capabilities available to the European Union. The second issue was the participation of non-EU NATO member states, mainly Turkey, in the integration process of “Berlin-Plus” arrangements.

Various working relationships between the European Union and NATO have been created at different levels since 1999 to address the participation of non-EU European allies and practical arrangements for European access to NATO assets and capabilities. These relationships brought together members from both organizations on a regular basis. However, Turkey was extremely disturbed by the new ESDP. Turkey had previously taken part in all the security discussions of the WEU, but ESDP didn't offer that possibility because Turkey was not a member of the European Union.<sup>29</sup>

As stated before, at the EU Cologne summit in June 1999, it was determined that the WEU would not become part of the European Union; instead the EU would adopt WEU-like functions to deal with the ESDP.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, Turkey was very alarmed about “... a potential loss of influence and in particular a situation in which Greece might be able to call upon the EU's rapid reaction force, which in turn would be able to call upon NATO assets for use in a conflict with Turkey in the Aegean.”<sup>31</sup> For that reason, Turkey decided in 2000 to “... block any EU access to NATO capabilities through exercising its veto in the NAC, unless Turkey is given ‘appropriate’ influence in the ESDP structures.”<sup>32</sup> Finally, after years of high-level negotiations, the EU and NATO resolved the long-running dispute between Turkey and Greece in December 2002.<sup>33</sup>

In Helsinki in December 1999, the European Council decided to strengthen European

defence capabilities and develop a crisis management capability in support of its CFSP. To establish European military capabilities, the EU member states set themselves so-called Helsinki Headline Goals. They first committed to build a force of 60,000 troops, capable of deploying within 60 days, and sustainable for up to one year in support of the Petersberg Tasks.<sup>34</sup>

To ensure the required strategic direction and guidance for EU-led operations, the EU established a new permanent military and political structure within the EU Council—modeled largely on NATO structures: the EU Political and Security Committee (made up of the ambassadors from each Member State's permanent EU representation in Brussels), the EU Military Committee (made up of the European Chiefs of Defence Staff), and the EU Military Staff (made up of senior military officers from the EU member states).<sup>35</sup>

In Lisbon in March 2000, it was decided to include a civilian crisis-management element in the ESDP plans—up to 5,000 police officers “... to do peace reconstruction work alongside civil and economic reconstruction.”<sup>36</sup> The European summit in Santa Maria de Feira in June 2000 documented in a capability catalogue the military capabilities and forces required to achieve the Helsinki Headline Goal. In addition, the Union encouraged member states, non-EU NATO member states, and the nations which had applied for membership of the EU to contribute to and improve Europe’s military capabilities.<sup>37</sup>

In November 2000, the EU member states took part in a Capabilities Commitment Conference and decided how to deliver the troops, planes, and ships to meet the Helsinki Headline Goal for the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force. In addition, European heads of state and government at the Nice European Council in December 2000 decided how the EU would run military crisis management operations.<sup>38</sup> A Capabilities Improvement Conference took place in November 2001 to address the existent capabilities gap. As a result, the European defence ministers developed the so-called European Capabilities Action

Plan (ECAP) to address the identified shortfalls.<sup>39</sup> Finally, the EU declared at the European Council in Laeken in December 2001 that the Union was now able to conduct “some” autonomous crisis management operations in context with the ESDP.<sup>40</sup>

At the Prague NATO summit in November 2002, NATO member states announced their willingness to give the EU the right to use NATO assets and capabilities for EU operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily. The signing of the “NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP” on 16 December 2002 formed the basis for the practical work between both organizations.<sup>41</sup> As a result, a strategic partnership was established between NATO and EU to work together in the areas of crisis management, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. In addition, this joint declaration assured EU access to NATO’s planning capability for EU-led military operations.

In March 2003, the transition from the NATO-led operation *Allied Harmony* to the EU-led operation *Concordia* in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) took place. This operation relied completely on NATO assets and capabilities under the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements. The aim of this operation was to contribute to a stable and secure environment to support the implementation of the government in the FYROM. It was completed in December 2003 and replaced by an EU-led police mission. Operation *Concordia* was the first autonomous EU-led military mission in history.<sup>42</sup>

NATO and the EU agreed in December 2003 on further NATO/EU consultation and planning. In this context, the EU established a permanent cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and NATO created a permanent liaison team at the European Military Staff in Brussels, Belgium.<sup>43</sup>

In December 2004, the European Union launched operation *EUFOR* in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This military operation replaced NATO’s *SFOR* mission. As a result of the agreements between NATO and the EU, the cooperation between both organizations has been

smooth and very efficient.

In June 2005, the EU launched operation *EUSEC DR Congo* to provide assistance and advice for a security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In March 2006, following a United Nations (UN) request in December 2005, the Council of the European Union launched the planning process for an ESDP mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. During this mission, up to 1,500 EU troops will be deployed to support the UN mission *MONUC* during the electoral process in June 2006.<sup>44</sup>

### **3 U.S. Perspective on European Security and Defence**

During the Cold War, the United States provided security and leadership for Western Europe's defence within NATO. The European Community prospered under the security shield provided by the United States. After the Cold War, the United States hoped to realize a “peace dividend” and began to reduce its forces in Europe. Europe was less of a security concern for America and they wanted the Europeans to shoulder a greater security and defence burden for the European continent. “At least in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the United States... would look for a peace ‘dividend’ by reducing defense expenditures, taking the opportunity to shift resources to other priorities.”<sup>45</sup> America supported the development of an ESDI within the Alliance—at least rhetorically, but at the same time “... President George H. W. Bush and his top officials... [were] ensuring continuity in US international leadership, including leadership of NATO,” as the higher priority.<sup>46</sup>

The United States was very concerned that ESDI would eventually lead to a competing security structure that would undermine the Alliance. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s well-known “three D’s” illustrated these concerns. The United States did not want a *decoupling* of Europe’s security from its own, a *duplication* of effort or

capabilities, nor *discrimination* against those NATO allies outside the EU.<sup>47</sup>

While America expressed its good will to make U.S. and NATO assets, capabilities, and Combined Joint Task Forces available for WEU-led military operations (“Berlin-Plus” arrangements), the United States made clear that NATO was its number one forum for political dialogue and military involvement in EU security matters.<sup>48</sup>

One classical U.S. argument against an autonomous European security and defence system was that it would present a back-door security assurance to present and future EU member states not covered by NATO’s core Article 5. “Because EU Member States like Finland and Austria, who are not members of NATO, will participate fully in the EU’s... [ESDI], they will indirectly affect the European input into NATO and may in crisis situations call upon the United States for military assistance.”<sup>49</sup> On 7 October 1999, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott expressed the U.S. government position: “‘We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO’.”<sup>50</sup>

The United Kingdom’s change of policy on EU defence compelled America to rethink its position toward the Europe Union’s growing defence ambitions. “Now that Washington has ‘lost’ its staunchest ally with an undiluted Atlanticist security orientation, the United States feels that the vitality of the Alliance may well be renewed by supporting the... [ESDP].”<sup>51</sup> Shortly after the EU Helsinki summit in December 1999, Secretary Talbott stated, “... there should be no confusion about America’s position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against; we are not ambivalent; we are not anxious; we are for it. We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged, on its own. Period. End of debate.”<sup>52</sup>

When President George W. Bush came to office in January 2001, he was initially

afraid that the European initiative might be undermining NATO, especially through the possible duplication of effort. After consultation with British Prime Minister Blair in February 2001, the new U.S. President accepted as bona fide that ESDP would not weaken NATO. As a result, “... the new administration appeared to settle into a relatively passive approach toward... [ESDP], perhaps in the belief that nothing dramatic affecting US interests was likely to happen in the near term.”<sup>53</sup> In addition, the new Bush administration didn’t expect that the ESDP initiative would do much to enhance European capabilities in NATO or the EU—there was little evidence that the European heads of state and government were increasing their defence budgets to “... buy the strategic lift and other assets required to make the force credible.”<sup>54</sup> As a result, President George W. Bush and his top officials didn’t expect much from NATO and the ESDP in the foreseeable future.

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, Europe’s emotional and political support for the United States left little doubt that Europe understood that these terrible attacks were also attacks on common European values such as individual freedom and democracy. “... One aspect that has become clear since September 11, 2001, is the common realization that terrorism and proliferation are emerging threats to both the United States and to Europe.”<sup>55</sup> As a result of the terrorist attacks, NATO’s collective defence clause—Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—was invoked immediately for the first time in the treaty’s history.<sup>56</sup>

Much has changed as a result of the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. As an immediate effect, new U.S. priorities superseded peace-keeping operations in the Balkans, and the U.S. began to transfer military assets away from Europe to fight the global war on terror. In 2006, the fight against global terrorism remains the number one priority for America. In this context, the United States is going beyond its traditional alliances—like NATO.

In October 2001, the United States chose a “coalition of the willing” instead of acting within NATO to fight the battle against terrorism in Afghanistan. “The United States had made it clear that, even though it appreciated the alliance’s declaration of an Article 5 response, it would conduct military operations itself, with ad hoc coalitions of willing countries... The United States decided not to ask that military operations be conducted through the NATO integrated command structure.”<sup>57</sup> NATO’s only contribution for this battle against terrorism was its joint-owned Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) fleet. These high value NATO assets were used to help patrol U.S. airspace while the U.S. deployed an equal number of their AWACS jets for use in the air campaign against Taliban forces in Afghanistan.<sup>58</sup>

In addition, after September 11, the United States raised its defence investment budget from 3.1 percent (2000) to 3.3 percent (2002) of its gross domestic product (GDP) while the majority of the remaining NATO member states still spend less than 2 percent of their GDP.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, the U.S has called for enhanced European defence and other capabilities to enable the EU member states to better share the global security burden—especially through preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, collecting and sharing intelligence information, and preventing terrorist attacks.

Today’s sceptical sight of the U.S. policy towards the ESDP will improve, if the future development of the ESDP is seen as consistent with the interests of the United States. The U.S. hopes that the ESDP will provide additional, credible and more autonomous military capabilities for European responses to security concerns—this would relieve the United States of some military burdens. In addition, the U.S. expects that the common ESDP will make the EU member states more willing to use those new military capabilities to conduct military missions in accordance with the Petersberg Tasks beyond Europe’s borders.

## **4      How will the ESDP develop?**

Today, the ESDP is very important for the European security architecture. With the decision to implement the ESDP, the EU decided that the security of the European continent should be maintained primarily by the European Union's own resources and some additional NATO assets. The future of the ESDP depends mostly on the political will of the member states and European military capabilities.

### **The Political Will of the EU Member States**

One of the key features of the ESDP is the voluntary nature of member states' commitments. Therefore, national sovereignty is one of the main barriers to the development of a single and autonomous ESDP. Almost all needed capabilities to conduct EU-led operations remain under the command and control authority of member states. "ESDP is a purely intergovernmental policy based on consensus: unanimity is required... member states cannot be outvoted nor compelled to field forces or pay for operations against their will. If there is no consensus, there is no common policy. If nobody wants or offers to contribute assets and capabilities, there is no operation."<sup>60</sup> Therefore, the successful implementation of the ESDP depends in large part upon the political will of the member states.

Today, there are 25 EU member states with different military budgets, strengths, capabilities, and perceptions about the use of military power. These diverse perceptions directly influence the common decision making process in the Union—dealing with international security crises with 25 EU member states is not easy. It will become even more complicated when Bulgaria and Romania join the European Union in 2007. At the same time, these two new EU member states bring a new geopolitical dimension to the EU and the CFSP.<sup>61</sup> Therefore, this European Union of 27 states will definitely enhance the EU's role as a global actor in tackling regional and global issues, in particular terrorism, organized crime,

and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The EU member states must now seek to develop a common European strategic culture through combined crisis management missions, exercises, and training, because “military alliances... are effective only when the members of these coalitions commit themselves to common goals.”<sup>62</sup> The ESDP will be a significant policy only if all the member states collectively commit themselves to common security interests and practices.

As stated before, the Europeans are constrained by national interests and diverse military traditions. The Iraq War of 2003 especially brought up bitter controversies between Europe’s leading powers—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. For the future, “European member states need to recognize that security can be delivered only by cooperative action and that exclusion from the collective project would be individually disastrous.”<sup>63</sup> For that reason, the Europeans must find the right equilibrium between the very different states in the ESDP.

EU member states must bolster the 2003 European Security Strategy (2003 ESS)—the so-called Solana Paper.<sup>64</sup> It was crafted to develop an autonomous European strategic culture and reinforce internal cohesion. This strategy shows a strong signal to the outside that Europe is ready and determined to take action in the global field of security and defence. Entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, this strategy is a process for the EU member states to focus on European strategic objectives.

The 2003 ESS states, “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”<sup>65</sup> It addresses three strategic aims for the EU and the ESDP: create a security zone around Europe; build international order; and tackle current security threats, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, weak and failing states, and international organized crime.<sup>66</sup>

This strategy is partly a response to the Union’s confusion over the Iraq war and

partly a response to the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, with its emphasis on pre-emption. “The Iraq crisis has thus produced a common awareness among Europe’s leaders of the need for strategic thinking on international security issues.”<sup>67</sup>

The 2003 ESS describes an alternative to the current unilateral approach of the United States. It pays great attention to the multifaceted roots of worldwide suffering, poverty, and the most recent wave of international terrorism.<sup>68</sup> According to the 2003 ESS, present global security threats should be addressed through multilateralism and the full range of the EU’s instruments of power. In addition, the strategy highlights the United Nations Charter as the essential framework for international relations, and “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is... [the EU’s] objective.”<sup>69</sup>

The EU, NATO, and the United States agree on common threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and weak or failing states. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, 11 March 2004 in Spain, and 7 July 2005 in the United Kingdom, the EU, NATO, and America recognized that confronting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist threats together is more productive than single action. Therefore, they work closely together to exchange intelligence information to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, prevent future terrorist attacks, and support, stabilize, and reconstruct societies in endangered states. But, as stated before, the European multilateral approach to today’s security challenges is different than the current United States approach. Therefore, it is very important that the EU, NATO, and the United States understand and respect their differences.

For that reason, there is a great need for an intense security dialogue between the EU, NATO and the United States. The EU, NATO and America should establish a mutually beneficially working relationship. Therefore, the European multilateral approach and its

definition of international order must be precisely communicated to the United States. This must happen in ways that will not weaken the global political, economic, and military influence that the EU seeks to exercise—Europe must be able to advance its own political aims when its interests do not align with those of the United States.

### **European Military Capabilities**

The EU has focused on the development of autonomous military capabilities since the beginning of the ESDP initiative. The European Council agreed during the 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki on the Headline Goal of up to 60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days, and sustainable for up to one year to carry out the Petersberg Tasks. This Helsinki Headline Goal was updated prior to the Capabilities Commitments Conference in November 2000 and specified up to 100,000 military troops, 100 ships, and approximately 400 combat aircraft.<sup>70</sup> As stated before, in December 2001, the EU Presidency declared in Laeken the EU capable of carrying out “limited” autonomous crisis management operations.

Since the Cold War, the nature of military campaigns has changed dramatically. Interstate conflicts have become more the exception than the rule, and intrastate conflicts have become the most important security issue since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Corrupt, weak or failing states, and repressive regimes are often the roots for these conflicts. In addition, non-state actors and high level violence characterize present campaigns. Therefore, military planning and thinking has changed and the transformation of EU member states’ military forces is underway.

With the agreement on the European Security Strategy in December 2003, the European heads of state and government decided to set themselves a new Headline Goal, adopted at the Brussels European Council meeting in June 2004.<sup>71</sup> This Headline Goal 2010 (HG 2010) builds on the updated Helsinki Headline Goal and envisions that EU member

states will “... be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union [European Constitutional Treaty].”<sup>72</sup>

The HG 2010 focuses mainly on interoperability, deployability, and sustainability. It lists milestones such as the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) by the end of 2004; the implementation of EU strategic lift joint coordination by 2005; the complete development of seven to nine rapidly deployable battlegroups by 2007; the availability of a European aircraft carrier by 2008; and “... appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space based by 2010.”<sup>73</sup>

Military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have shown an apparent and increasing capabilities gap between U.S. and European militaries. The Kosovo war in 1999 especially showed the need to improve European military capabilities. During this conflict, the United States possessed all the necessary strategic assets, such as command and control, ISR, PGMs, superior strategic transport, and logistic resources, to conduct crisis management missions—the EU member states did not. The Kosovo war made absolutely clear to the European heads of state and government that the EU was far from having an independent European collective security capacity.

This continuing lack of military capabilities and assets is a major weakness for the ESDP. Allied interoperability and growing differences in European and U.S. defence spending will further aggravate this issue. The global war on terror is increasing the EU-U.S. capabilities gap even further. The future of coalition forces will mainly depend on the development and sharing of very expensive and capable communications and information technologies among the EU and the United States. This will make it very difficult for EU troops and weapon systems to remain interoperable with American forces. But the EU needs autonomous capabilities as well to strengthen the EU’s civilian and military crisis

management ambitions. The 2003 ESS states in this context, “as a union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously.”<sup>74</sup>

Europe needs a capable and strong military industrial and technological base to become an autonomous and viable civilian and military power. Enhancing European capabilities is a common and very important objective within the European Union. But today’s military technology is increasingly sophisticated and expensive. Therefore, EU member states must work together on the manufacturing of arms. In addition, the European states must develop combined military capabilities to be interoperable with each other, non-EU NATO member states, and the United States.

During the Thessaloniki European Council meeting in June 2003, the European heads of state and government agreed to establish the EDA in Brussels. Its mission “... is to support the Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the EU’s defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future.”<sup>75</sup> The task for the EDA is to work in the areas of Defence Capabilities Development, Military Research, and European Acquisition and Armaments.

According to Solana, “the European Defence Agency has been set up to improve... [the] input-output ratio. In essence, the EDA is about ensuring that we have the tools to do the job, and spend our money on the right things – what tomorrow’s operations will require, not yesterday’s. And it is about the member-states addressing the challenge together. The logic is operational, and it is economic.”<sup>76</sup> The EDA defines the key capabilities needed for the ESDP, promotes and enhances European armament cooperation, strengthens the European defence equipment market, and enhances European defence research and technology activities.<sup>77</sup>

Autonomous action by the EU, through the ESDP, requires European military

leadership and planning capacities be as flexible as possible. According to the “Berlin-Plus” agreements, the EU has assured access to NATO assets and capabilities, such as NATO headquarters. Today, the Europeans could not conduct autonomous military operations without NATO. All ESDP operations, currently and in the past, “... have been conducted from within NATO command structures, employing NATO assets.”<sup>78</sup>

The current dependence on NATO capabilities does not mean that the European Union cannot act independently. But in the event of two crises occurring in the world at the same time, one vital to the European Union and one vital to the United States, such dependence will definitely hinder the EU’s ability to act. This would also be the case in a crisis in which the United States entirely disagrees with the EU.

These limitations drive Europe to build up a genuine military autonomy. At the Capability Improvement Conference in November 2001, the EU decided to implement the European Capabilities Action Plan to address identified shortfalls such as air-to-air-refueling; combat search and rescue; headquarters; nuclear, biological and chemical protection; special operations forces; theatre ballistic missile defence; unmanned aerial vehicles; strategic airlift; space assets; interoperability issues for humanitarian and evacuation operations; strategic sealift; medical; attack and support helicopters; and ISTAR and ground surveillance.<sup>79</sup> As a result, the EU established fifteen project groups to develop practical solutions, each headed by a lead nation.<sup>80</sup> But this move towards operational autonomy will take some time.

Almost no EU member state by itself is currently able to conduct crisis management operations in combination with expeditionary warfare.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, pooling of critical military assets and capabilities such as strategic and tactical airlift, intelligence gathering, satellites, and communications is a necessity. Additionally, it helps to reduce the overhead costs for each EU member state. This might release financial resources to allow the funding of new and critical capabilities.<sup>82</sup> In addition, sharing of pooled resources leads to greater

interoperability, common doctrine, standardized equipment, and the need to perform joint training and exercises.

Today, the European Union focuses mainly on crisis management tasks and plays a complementary role to NATO in enhancing European and global security and stability. But “the ESDP… lacks independent unified doctrine and standard operating procedures [SOPs].”<sup>83</sup> Therefore, the EU needs to harmonize and develop its own common military strategies and SOPs for autonomous crisis management operations—similar to NATO’s Standardization Agreements and SOPs. This is very important to improve military coordination among the member states in the event that key NATO assets are not available for EU-led operations.

## **5 Conclusion**

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the EU focused on fostering economic stability, wealth, and security in Europe. Today, the European Union is a political union of 450 million people in 25 countries that generate 25% of the world’s gross national product.<sup>84</sup> It cannot cut itself off from the rest of the world—the EU has a global strategic responsibility based on its size, population, and economic power.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, and the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989-91, it soon became clear that U.S. leadership in Europe was problematic. Washington was unwilling to accept casualties in European conflicts where America’s national interests were not clearly at stake. But many EU member states recognized the need for a strong partnership with the United States based on shared political leadership and rebalanced military capabilities. As a result, they took the initiative to create the ESDP—the ESDP was in part born from the fear that the United States might de-couple from the EU and NATO.

The evolution of the ESDP is a remarkable part of the European integration process. The Kosovo crisis especially spurred the development of the ESDP. Since the Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998, a breathtaking dynamic was set free to create an autonomous ESDP within the European Union. The member states appointed Javier Solana as the High Representative of the CFSP and created a new institutional structure for the ESDP—the Political Security Committee, the Military Committee, and the Military Staff. Additionally, the European Defence Agency was established to develop, strengthen, and promote European defence capabilities.

Furthermore, the member states decided to implement HG 2010. This Headline Goal calls for up to 100,000 troops, 100 ships, and approximately 400 combat aircraft, and focuses mainly on a newly designed battlegroup concept. With these battlegroups, the Europeans focus on small, very flexible and highly deployable military forces. They are a Rapid Reaction Force of units up to 1,500 military troops, capable of high intensity warfare to restore international security and peace. These soldiers can deploy within 15 days to conduct humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping tasks in crisis management operations—if NATO as a whole doesn't want to be engaged. As of today, these Rapid Reaction Forces must borrow assets and capabilities from NATO to conduct effective military operations.

Much has been accomplished during a very short period of time. The 2003 European Security Strategy clearly outlines the European Union's strategic objectives. In this context, more than 70,000 European military troops are currently deployed on various operations within and beyond EU borders.<sup>85</sup> Since 1998/1999, the EU has become an actor which now has the capacity to deploy European military forces.

In the future, the EU member states must focus on “lessons learned” from recent civilian and military crisis management operations. They must also become increasingly aware of their existing capability gaps. Without addressing these shortfalls, EU member

states will find themselves less and less able to operate individually or collectively, i.e. with the United States. Therefore, the success of the ESDP hinges on the improvement of European defence capabilities. The EU must take serious action to close, or at least minimize, the capability gaps to be able to maintain autonomous security in Europe and beyond.

The EU must also improve its ability to execute successful civilian and military crisis management operations, and partner with the United States, NATO, and other international organizations. It is a big challenge to improve capabilities, coordination, and reliability within the member states of the European Union. To evolve into a “... global strategic actor with a common defence policy, the EU now needs to take its general statements under the new Headline Goal 2010 and make progress on its key benchmarks not least developing scenarios that test Member States’ commitments to provide sufficient troops and capabilities that can meet the need for concurrent, sustainable, and projectable forces.”<sup>86</sup>

Today, the ESDP is a well-recognized addition to the European Union’s instruments of power portfolio. The future of the ESDP will depend on whether the soon-to-be 27 EU member states can agree on future common threats and on the pursuit of collective strategic interests as outlined in the 2003 European Security Strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. This will require applying the European Union’s common political will to deploy the large variety of diplomatic, economic and, last but not least, military instruments of power against possible adversaries.

## Endnotes

1. United Nations, “Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at United Nations Headquarters, 24 February 1998, Press Release SG/SM/6470,” 2, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980224.SGSM6470.html>.
2. In 1952 Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands founded the European Coal and Steel Community, followed by the European Economic Community (EC) in 1958. Later Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the Community. The European Union was established under that name by the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in February 1992. John van Oudenaren, *Uniting Europe : an introduction to the European Union*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 8-12.
3. France, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United States, and the United Kingdom founded NATO in 1949. Greece, Turkey, Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain joined the Alliance during the Cold War. Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia became members of NATO after the Cold War. Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic community : the transatlantic bargain challenged*, 2nd ed., (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), xiii.
4. The ESDP has a civil and military dimension. For both, the EU has to make use of national capabilities and assets. This paper focuses mainly on the military ESDP.
5. Jolyon Howorth, *The European Security Conundrum: Prospects for ESDP after September 11, 2001*, Notre Europe Policy Paper 1 (Paris: Notre Europe, March 2002), 1.
6. The following EU member states were also NATO members in 1991: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Ireland was an EU member state but not an Alliance member.
7. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, “The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy,” in *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 6-7. After the Cold War, the United States pressured Europe to increase their defence budgets and seemed to be less interested in Europe. In addition, it was obvious for the Europeans that the United States used its National Missile Defence (NMD) program to “... drag its allies into crisis scenarios or ‘global’ strategies while disengaging itself from the Old Continent....” Frédéric Bozo, “The Effects of Kosovo and the Danger of Decoupling,” in *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 69.
8. Jean-Yves Haine, “ESDP: an overview,” 1, <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf>.

9. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union*, 91.
10. The Treaty on European Union was signed by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom and came into force on 1 November 1993. Van Oudenaren, *Uniting Europe*, 54-58.
11. European Union, “Treaty on European Union,” Title V, Article J.4. No. 1, <http://www.europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>.
12. Van Oudenaren, *Uniting Europe*, 295.
13. European Union, “Treaty on European Union,” Title V, Article J.4. No. 5.
14. Members of the Western European Union: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Peter van Ham, *Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia*, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 1 (April 2000), 4.
15. Michael E. Smith, *Europe’s foreign and security policy: the institutionalization of cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 232.
16. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union*, 94.
17. NATO, “Final Communiqué, Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, 3 June 1996,” paragraph 7, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>.
18. Ibid., paragraph 7.
19. Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy : NATO’s Companion—or Competitor?* (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2002), 18.
20. United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, “Joint Declaration on European Defence, 04 December 1998,” 1, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&aid=1013618395073>.
21. Ibid., 1.
22. Hunter, *European Security and Defense Policy*, 53-54.
23. NATO, “Washington Summit Communiqué, Press Release NAC-S(99)64, 24 April 1999,” paragraph 10, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>.
24. Alexander Moens, “ESDP, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance,” in *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 31-32.
25. Van Ham, *Europe’s New Defence Ambitions*, 5.

26. Ibid., 5.
27. François Heisbourg, *European Defence: making it work*, Chaillot Paper 42 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 2000), 6.
28. Shortly after, he was appointed Secretary General of the WEU. Dr. Javier Solana was the Secretary General of NATO from 1995–1999. Richard G. Whitman, “NATO, the EU and ESDP: An Emerging Division of Labour?” *Contemporary Security Policy*, no. 25 (December 2004): 435.
29. Sunniva Tofte, “Non-EU NATO Members and the Issue of Discrimination,” in *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 143-44.
30. Finally, the WEU was absorbed into the EU over the next few years. Smith, *Europe's foreign and security policy*, 233-34.
31. Van Oudenaren, *Uniting Europe*, 311.
32. Tofte, “Non-EU NATO Members,” 151.
33. Ibid., 140-50. Turkey was assured that only European NATO member or partner states could request the initiation of EU-led operations. This addressed their concern about Cyprus requesting a EU-led operation against them. The Turkish bid to become an EU member was another motivation for them to give in and accept the ESDP in the end.
34. Gustav Lindstrom, “The Headline Goal,” 1, <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/05-gl.pdf>.
35. Jolyon Howorth, *European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge?* Chaillot Paper 43 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 2000), 32-33.
36. Moens, “ESDP,” 30.
37. European Union, “Presidency Conclusions : Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000,” 2, [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm).
38. Terry Teriff, “The CJTF Concept and the Limits of European Autonomy,” in *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 45.
39. The European defence ministers identified 55 major shortfalls including force protection, operational mobility, and logistics. Lindstrom, “Headline Goal,” 3.
40. Mark Webber, “NATO Enlargement and European Defense Autonomy,” in *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 175.
41. European Union, “Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common

Foreign and Security Policy, following the agreement on the establishment of EU-NATO permanent arrangements, Brussels, 16 December 2002,” 1-3, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/73803%20-%20Solana%20-%20Permanent%20arrangements%20+%20NATO%20declaration.pdf>.

42. Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP – How it works,” in *EU Security and Defence Policy : The first five years (1999-2004)*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 58.
43. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union*, 200.
44. The military contingent will be led by a multinational staff at the German Bundeswehr Operations Command (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr) in Potsdam and the headquarters in the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) will be under French control.
45. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union*, 86.
46. Ibid., 182.
47. USIS Washington File, “Speech by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 15 December 1999,” <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/news99/991215-bmd-usia1.htm>.
48. Michael Quinlan, *European defense cooperation : asset or threat to NATO?* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 17.
49. Van Ham, *Europe's New Defence Ambitions*, 14.
50. Howorth and Keeler, “EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy,” 11.
51. Van Ham, *Europe's New Defence Ambitions*, 14. The United States never really liked the European ESDP initiative and opposed it as long as it could (until the British Prime Minister changed the policy of the United Kingdom).
52. USIS Washington File, “Speech by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.” Following the air war in Kosovo the U.S. believed that the EU NATO member states should spend more money for the enhancement of European NATO capabilities instead of concentrating and spending money for the development of new structures for the ESDP (which was perceived as direct competition to NATO).
53. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union*, 198.
54. Ibid., 198.
55. Simon Serfaty [et al.], *The future of the transatlantic defense community : final report of the CSIS Commission on Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century*, CSIS panel report (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2003), 47.

56. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union*, 214. Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>.

57. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union*, 214.

58. Ibid., 215. NATO did not send its AWACS jets to Afghanistan because the military operations there were a joint U.S.-British campaign and not a NATO-led operation. Today, EU NATO member states are contributing military forces to the UN-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) to maintain and support the security in Afghanistan. Several member states are commanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams to support the successful reconstruction of Afghanistan. In addition, the EU provided financial support for the Afghan parliamentary and Presidential election in 2004.

59. Serfaty, *Future of the transatlantic defense*, 57. In the fiscal year 2006, the U.S. spends 3.7 percent of its GDP (around \$ 419 billion) on national defence.

60. Missiroli, “ESDP – How it works,” 57.

61. Bulgaria is a crossing point to the Black Sea regions and Balkans; Romania is an important interface with eastern Europe.

62. Anthony King, “The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, no. 26, (April 2005): 57.

63. Ibid., 46.

64. As the EU High Representative for the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, Dr. Javier Solana had the overall responsibility for developing the 2003 European Security Strategy.

65. European Union, *European Security Strategy : A Secure Europe in a better World* (Brussels, 12 December 2003), 1, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

66. Ibid., 3-4.

67. Haine, “ESDP: an overview,” 7.

68. The 2003 ESS regards the destabilizing effects of regional conflicts such as Kashmir, the Great Lakes area of Africa, and the Korean Peninsula as the roots of extremism, state failure, terrorism, and organized crime. European Union, *European Security Strategy*, 4.

69. Ibid., 9.
70. Lindstrom, “Headline Goal,” 3. NATO and EU member states usually have the same pool of forces and capabilities for both organizations. Therefore, these forces are generally dual-hatted.
71. European Union, “Headline Goal 2010,” 1, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>.
72. Ibid., 1. The practical development of the Headline Goal 2010 will be barely effected by the refusal of the referenda on the European Constitutional Treaty through the Netherlands and France because ESDP innovations could be included as amendments to the Treaty of Nice.
73. Ibid., 3. Battlegroups are units of approximately 1,500 troops, deployable within 15 days, and sustainable from at least 30 days to 120 days. These units are “designed specifically (but not exclusively) to be used in response to a request from the UN and capable of participating in an autonomous operation under a Chapter VII [of the UN Charter] mandate [action to restore international security and peace].” European Union, “The battlegroups concept – UK/France/Germany food for thought paper,” in *EU security and defence : Core documents 2004*, Chaillot Paper 75 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 11.
74. European Union, *European Security Strategy*, 11.
75. European Union, “Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency,” in *EU security and defence : Core documents 2004*, Chaillot Paper 75 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 178.
76. European Union, “Speech by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the 40th Commanders Conference of the German Bundeswehr, Bonn, 11 October 2005,” 4, [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/discours/86523.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/discours/86523.pdf).
77. European Union, “Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP,” 179-80. Joint projects like the Airbus A400M large strategic transport aircraft and the Eurofighter already demonstrate that the EU member states have begun to build up a common European arms manufacture.
78. King, “Future of the European Security and Defence Policy,” 51.
79. Thomas Bauer, “Militärische Fähigkeiten der EU : Headline Goal, Capability Action Plan und die EU-Battlegroups,” *Strategie und Technik*, no. 48 (Mai 2005): 19.
80. Lead nation for air-to-air-refueling: Spain; combat search and rescue: Germany; headquarters: United Kingdom; nuclear, biological and chemical protection: Italy; special operations forces: Portugal; theatre ballistic missile defence: Netherlands; unmanned aerial vehicles: France; strategic airlift: Germany; space assets: France; interoperability issues for humanitarian and evacuation operations: Belgium; strategic sealift: Greece; medical: Netherlands; attack and support helicopters: Italy; and ISTAR and ground

surveillance: United Kingdom. Bauer, “Militärische Fähigkeiten der EU,” 19.

81. Only France and the United Kingdom may be currently able—with limits—to conduct crisis management operations in combination with expeditionary warfare.
82. Volker Heise, *Militärische Integration in Europa : Erfahrungen und neue Ansätze*, SWP-Study 26 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2005), 6.
83. King, “Future of the European Security and Defence Policy,” 55.
84. European Union, *European Security Strategy*, 1.
85. European Union, “Javier Solana at the 40th Commanders Conference,” 4.
86. Fraser Cameron and Gerrard Quille, *ESDP: The State of Play*, European Policy Centre Working Paper 11 (Brussels: European Policy Centre, September 2004), 29.

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